By Eryk Michael Smith
A recent New York Times investigation has drawn attention to a quieter, less conventional way maritime power can be exercised, without warships ever leaving port. In early January 2026, thousands of Chinese fishing vessels assembled into tightly coordinated formations in the East China Sea, not to fish, but to hold position.
Using ship-tracking data, researchers identified two separate operations involving roughly 1,400 and 2,000 vessels. Instead of spreading out, the boats formed dense, organized lines stretching hundreds of kilometers. Nearby cargo ships slowed, rerouted, or carefully threaded through gaps. The fleets remained in place for more than a day, an unusual sight for any commercial fishing operation.
Analysts believe the activity reflects China’s growing maritime militia capability, which relies heavily on civilian fishing boats that receive state guidance and support. What stood out was not new hardware, but coordination: mobilizing thousands of vessels simultaneously and directing them into disciplined formations points to increasingly sophisticated command-and-control from shore.
For shipping companies, the implications are practical rather than theoretical. Large clusters of small vessels complicate navigation, create radar clutter, and raise insurance and operating costs. Even without a declared blockade, few commercial operators would willingly sail through a crowded and ambiguous maritime barrier.
For Taiwan, including port cities like Kaohsiung, the concern is less about one specific incident and more about precedent. Kaohsiung plays a central role in Taiwan’s energy and industrial logistics, handling a significant share of LNG imports and petrochemical processing. Any disruption near its sea lanes would have ripple effects across the island and beyond.
Speaking to the Kaohsiung Times, ingeniSPACE COO Jason Wang, whose team first flagged the January activity, noted that regional neighbors are investing heavily in satellite-based maritime awareness, while Taiwan is still scaling up. Experts say closing that gap will be essential for monitoring fast-moving, gray-zone activity at sea. Speaking to the Kaohsiung Times, Wang said, “Taiwan needs hundreds of satellites across a wide-range of sensors that can image multiple times a day across multiple locations. Japan and Korea are doing just that and aggressively expanding the number of geospatial intelligence analysts to absorb the slew of data.”
The broader takeaway is not that conflict is imminent, but that sea control no longer looks the way it used to. Chinese policy and military writings describe maritime militia forces as tools for signaling, surveillance, and pressure, often operating below the threshold of open confrontation. If challenged, their civilian status allows Beijing to frame incidents as accidents or overreactions.
For Kaohsiung and other major ports across the First Island Chain, the lesson is straightforward: maintaining open sea lanes increasingly depends on visibility, data, and early awareness. In today’s maritime environment, fishing boats could matter almost as much as warships; perhaps more.
