By Najamuddin Khairur Rijal
Cover AI image by Gemini.
As Indonesia’s president, Prabowo Subianto, declared the arrival of “The New Indonesia,” built on a pledge to eradicate corruption, the country was confronting sobering numbers. Its 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index ranking slid to 109th globally. In the same index, Taiwan ranked 24th with a score nearly double Indonesia’s. The gap between the two is not merely statistical; it reflects deeper differences in institutional design, civic space and political will.
At the Indonesia Economic Outlook 2026 forum on Feb. 13, the president introduced “The New Indonesia” as a renewed commitment to ensure that corruption would no longer be tolerated. The message was clear: Indonesia must turn the page.
Yet public expectations for clean and accountable governance have intensified precisely because trust is fragile. Transparency International’s latest report shows that Indonesia scored 34 out of 100 in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), down from 37 in 2024. Two consecutive years of decline place the country well below the global average and behind many of its regional peers.
This drop is more than a technical fluctuation. Within the CPI framework, a lower score indicates a higher perceived level of public-sector corruption, whether in bureaucratic procedures, procurement systems, or law enforcement institutions. The downward trend signals not only that corruption remains pervasive, but also that confidence in the state’s ability to contain it is weakening.
Multiple assessments suggest that the erosion of public oversight and institutional effectiveness lies at the heart of Indonesia’s decline. Independent media outlets and civil society organizations have historically played a crucial role in uncovering abuses of power. When civic space contracts, oversight mechanisms weaken. Recent reports from Reporters Without Borders indicate that Indonesia’s press freedom ranking has also deteriorated, limiting the ability of journalists and watchdog groups to expose misconduct.
Law enforcement presents another structural vulnerability. National anti-corruption evaluations show that rule-of-law indicators remain among the weakest components of Indonesia’s governance profile. A rule-of-law score hovering around 27 underscores the persistent inconsistency in prosecuting corruption cases and enforcing accountability.
The challenge, therefore, is not simply legislative. Indonesia has enacted numerous anti-corruption laws and established institutions designed to combat graft. The deeper issue lies in implementation, bureaucratic culture and the degree of institutional independence. Without systemic reform, anti-corruption commitments risk remaining rhetorical.
Learning from Taiwan
Taiwan offers a compelling comparative case. According to Transparency International’s 2025 CPI, Taiwan scored 68 out of 100 and ranked 24th globally. Its position reflects sustained institutional investment rather than episodic political messaging.
For decades, Taiwan has treated anti-corruption policy as a central pillar of governance. Institutions such as the Agency Against Corruption, operating under the Ministry of Justice, have developed professional investigative capacity while maintaining operational autonomy. Legal frameworks are comprehensive and aligned with the principles of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), addressing corruption in both public and private sectors.
Equally significant is Taiwan’s open civic environment. A free press, active civil society, and accessible public data create conditions for continuous scrutiny of state power. Transparency is not incidental; it is embedded within governance mechanisms. This institutional architecture strengthens public trust and reinforces accountability.
The divergence between Indonesia and Taiwan thus rests on two fundamental variables: institutional independence and civic openness. Taiwan has consolidated both as strategic components of national governance. Indonesia, meanwhile, continues to grapple with questions surrounding the autonomy of oversight bodies and the robustness of public participation in monitoring authority.
If “The New Indonesia” is to move beyond symbolism, several lessons become evident. First, institutional independence must be safeguarded. Anti-corruption bodies such as Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) require strong legal protection from political interference and sustained investment in investigative capacity.
Second, civic space must be preserved and expanded. Media freedom and civil society engagement are not peripheral to anti-corruption policy; they are foundational.
Third, law enforcement reform must be comprehensive. Training, monitoring mechanisms and incentive structures should align with principles of integrity and professional accountability.
Fourth, transparency should be institutionalized as a systemic obligation. Public access to budget data, procurement contracts, and administrative decisions reduces opportunities for hidden corruption.
The contrast between Indonesia and Taiwan is not about political systems alone. It is about institutional consistency. Taiwan’s CPI performance did not emerge from a single declaration, but from sustained structural commitment. Indonesia’s anti-corruption promise, framed under “The New Indonesia,” carries political weight. Yet credibility will ultimately depend on whether institutional reforms match rhetorical ambition.
If Indonesia can translate its pledge into durable institutional safeguards, protecting oversight bodies, expanding civic space, and strengthening rule-of-law enforcement, improvements in corruption perception will follow. Investor confidence, democratic participation, and governance quality would likely improve as well.
But if reform remains aspirational rather than structural, the numbers will continue to speak louder than the slogans. In that sense, Taiwan is not merely a comparator. It is a reminder that integrity is built through systems, not declarations.
About the Author:
Najamuddin Khairur Rijal is an associate professor in the International Relations Department at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia
