Author: Chen-Yuan Tung

By Dr. TUNG Chen-Yuan, Taiwan’s Representative to Singapore. According to the latest estimates by Bloomberg Economics, as of May 2026, the average tariff imposed by the United States on imports from Taiwan stands at only 7%, lower than the 10% applied to the European Union, the 9% imposed on the United Kingdom and Mexico, the 12% levied on Vietnam, Germany, Thailand, and India, as well as the 13% and 15% imposed on Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia respectively. In contrast, tariffs on Chinese imports remain as high as 21%. These figures reflect far more than differences in tariff rates. They…

This “deliberate absence” was no accident. Rather, it reflects a consistent policy choice by Singapore. For a country with an ethnic Chinese majority but a deeply diverse society, Singapore has always drawn a strict line between personal ties of blood and culture, and national political loyalty and policy orientation. Political leaders’ distance from their ancestral hometowns is an important symbol: internally, it strengthens national cohesion; externally, it demonstrates independence.

Taiwanese travel to Singapore has also grown steadily, with a total of 91,190 visitors recorded in January and February, up 14.5%. Notably, in February alone, the number of Taiwanese visitors to Singapore surged to 55,120, representing a sharp 64.6% increase and indicating a clear acceleration.

TUNG Chen-Yuan, PhD, Taiwan’s Representative to Singapore According to projections by the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS), Japan’s semiconductor market is expected to reach approximately US$ 50.16 billion in 2026, representing an annual growth rate of 11.9%. This expansion not only reflects spillover effects from surging AI demand, but also indicates that Japan’s recent policies promoting domestic manufacturing and supply chain reconstruction are beginning to bear fruit. Overall, Japan’s semiconductor policy has shifted from short-term subsidies during the pandemic toward a more institutionalized, long-term strategic support framework. This transition has gradually given rise to a “dual-track manufacturing strategy,” in which…

Last year, Taiwan became Singapore’s largest trading partner and source of imports for the first time. Approximately 85% of Taiwan’s exports to Singapore were semiconductor-related products, while about 80% of Singapore’s exports to Taiwan fell into the same category. In the first two months of 2025, Taiwan’s exports to Singapore grew by 56%, while Singapore’s semiconductor industry expanded by nearly 52%, demonstrating strong industrial linkage and mutual prosperity.

Singapore has become an increasingly important source of Taiwan’s overall trade surplus. In 2022, Taiwan’s surplus with Singapore accounted for more than 33% of Taiwan’s total trade surplus, and it remained close to 30% in 2024. Although the share was 17.5% in 2025, it rose again to 21.9% in January–February 2026, meaning that more than one-fifth of Taiwan’s total trade surplus now comes from Singapore.

Data from the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB) indicate that Singapore produces about 10% of the world’s semiconductors and manufactures roughly 20% of global semiconductor equipment.

Stronger penalties and institutional innovation can raise costs and slow damage. But the long-term solution lies in deeper cross-border cooperation, continued advancement in financial technology, and enhanced digital literacy among the public.

Amid geopolitical risks and supply chain realignment, South Korea has elevated semiconductors to the level of national strategy. Under its “K-Semiconductor Vision and Strategy in the AI Era,” the government plans to invest approximately 700 trillion won (around US$ 520 billion) by 2047 to build the world’s largest semiconductor cluster, with 16 new fabrication plants scheduled by 2030. It has also established a 50 trillion won (around US$ 37 billion) industry fund, offering up to 25% tax credits for facility investment and 50% for R&D, while aiming to cultivate 150,000 semiconductor professionals by 2030 to strengthen the industry’s integrated innovation ecosystem.

According to the latest statistics, from the law’s implementation through early February 2026, police issued 12 Restriction Orders to banks, buying critical intervention time for affected individuals. The proportion of victims who “voluntarily transferred funds to scammers” declined slightly from 82.4% in 2024 to 81.8% in 2025, suggesting that the long-term effectiveness of “protective intervention” warrants continued observation.